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I. Introduction
The concept of internal armed conflict in contemporary
international humanitarian law has been, to a considerable
extent, fashioned by the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 1 The case
that sets out the standard for judging the parameters of internal
armed conflict is that of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic.2 The
* Ph.D. Candidate, Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University
of Ireland, Galway. B.A. (Milltown Institute), M.A. (N.U.I., Galway),
LL.M. (N.U.I., Galway). The author would like to acknowledge
funding received from the Irish Research Council for the Humanities
and Social Sciences in the form of a research scholarship.
1 See generally C. Byron, Armed Conflicts. International or Non-
international?, 6 (1) JCSL 63 (2001).
2 The following three decisions will be examined in some detail:
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2
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universal significance of the Tadic case for international
humanitarian law is underlined by the following statement of the
ICTY Trial Chamber:
[I]t is the first determination of individual guilt
or innocence in connection with serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law by a truly
international tribunal, the International Tribunal
being the first such tribunal to be established by
the United Nations. The international military
tribunals at Nurenberg and Tokyo, its predeces-
sors, were multinational in nature, representing
only part of the world community.
3
This article elucidates the parameters of internal armed
conflict using the conceptual framework provided by the ICTY
in the Tadic case. In doing so, the grounds for distinguishing
situations of internal armed conflict from internal disturbance are
investigated alongside the conditions propounded by the
Tribunal for recognizing an armed conflict's change in status
from internal to international.
The article is structured in two parts. The first part
examines the grounds for recognizing the existence of armed
conflict. In doing so, conditions that trigger the application of
international humanitarian law in situations of internal armed
conflict are discussed. The second part unpacks two decisions of
the Tribunal, each advocating a different means of assessing the
involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina after May 19, 1992.4 Also in part two,
October 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Jurisdiction Decision]; Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1
[hereinafter Tadic Appeals Judgment]; and Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72 (7 May 1997)
[hereinafter Tadic Trial Judgment].
3 Id. 1.
4 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 1; Tadic Appeals Judgment,
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the grounds for the classification of armed conflict as either
internal or international are examined.
The overall objective of this article is to outline the
parameters of internal armed conflict utilizing case law of the
ICTY in order to elucidate some important distinctions that are
required in determining the status of an armed conflict and thus
also the applicable body of international law.
II. The Recognition of De Facto Armed Conflict
This section illustrates the cardinal conditions determining
the applicability of international humanitarian law to situations of
non-international armed conflict. It is structured in three parts.
The first examines the body of law governing internal armed
conflict, explicating the conditions that govern the scope of its
application. The thresholds at which Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II are applicable as well as the problems that
surrounding their respective implementation are discussed. The
second part analyzes the formula propounded by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber, defining the concept of armed conflict. In
doing so, the requirements of the concept are elucidated, illu-
strating the grounds for the application of Common Article 3. The
formula provided by the ICTY Appeals Chamber is discussed
further in the third section, its adaptation in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) is scrutinized.
A. The Grounds for Applying International
Humanitarian Law
One of the most problematic areas of international
humanitarian law, in terms of its implementation, is the law that
governs the conduct of hostilities in situations of internal armed
conflict. Hersh Lauterpacht stated in 1952: "if international law
is at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is at the vanishing
point of international law.",5 More recently, Rein MUllerson
supra note 2, 5.
5 H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 39
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added to Lauterpacht's metaphor, asserting "international
humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts is at the
vanishing point of international humanitarian law."
6
The main body of codified law governing situations of
non-international armed conflict consists of Article 3 common to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Common Article 3), 7
Additional Protocol II of 1977,8 and Article 19 of the Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict of 1954. 9 Other instruments that contain
provisions pertaining to non-international armed conflicts
include the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices of 1996,'o and the Rome
BYBIL 139 (1952).
6 R. Mfillerson, International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts 2
JACL 125 (1997).
7 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, art. 3,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 3118, 75 UNTS 31, 32, 34; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, art. 3,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 3220, 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86, 88; Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136, 138; Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 3520,75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288, 290.
8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed
Conflicts (adopted June 8, 1977) 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol II].
9 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, art. 19, 249 U.N.T.S 240, 256.
10 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices to the 1981 United Nations Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol II), adopted May 3, 1996, art.
1(3), reprinted in 35 I.L.M 1206, 1209.
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Statute of the International Criminal Court. " The present
discussion focuses on Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II in order to highlight their respective thresholds of
application and to demonstrate common problems in their
implementation.
1. Common Article 3
When the existence of armed conflict is recognized,
certain provisions of international humanitarian law that seek to
ensure a minimum standard of humane treatment automatically
come into force. This occurs irrespective of whether the parties
to the conflict have agreed to be bound by the Geneva
Conventions or have ratified either of the Additional Protocols.'
2
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
embodies such mandatory provisions. It is the only Article in the
Conventions that is concerned specifically with non-international
armed conflict. According to the International Court of Justice,
Common Article 3 represents a codification of customary
international law.13 This view is supported by statements of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 14 and the
jurisprudence of the ICTY 15 and the ICTR 16 in addition to
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(0 (17 July
1998), reprinted in 37 1.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
12 Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3; Protocol I1June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S 609.
13 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
14 See Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War: Commentary, at 36, International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) (1958): [Common Article 3] merely demands
respect for certain rules, which were already recognised as essential in
all civilised countries, and embodied in the municipal law of the states
in question, long before the Convention was signed .... no government
can object to observing, in its dealings with internal enemies, whatever
the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential rules
which it in fact observes daily, under its own laws, even when dealing
with common criminals.
"5 See e.g., Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 2, 116, 134.
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writings of eminent scholars of international humanitarian law.' 7
As a codification of customary international law, it is binding on
all parties to an armed conflict, including non-state actors,
irrespective of their recognition of the law governing armed
conflict.18
The context for the Common Article's application is
stated as being an "armed conflict not of an international
character." However, it contains no definition of the term "armed
conflict" and does not provide conditions governing its
application. As there is no set of criteria contained in the Geneva
Conventions outlining conditions for the recognition of armed
conflict, the characterization of a situation using only the
common Article is problematic. The drafting history of Common
Article 3 offers some indication of the kinds of conditions
deemed to merit the application of international humanitarian
law. The Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference notes the
following criteria, which distinguish situations reaching the
threshold of non-international armed conflict:
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure
Government possesses an organized military
force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting
within a determinate territory and having the
means of respecting and ensuring respect for the
Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have
recourse to the regular military forces against
16 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, 608 (2 September
1998) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Akayseu].
17 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms
as Customary Law, 35 (1989). See also Christopher Greenwood,
International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 265 (1996).
18 See Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the
Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238,
246 (1996).
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insurgents organized as military and in
possession of a part of the national territory.
(3) (a) That the de jure Government has
recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a
belligerent; or
(c) that it has accorded the insurgents
recognition as belligerents for the purposes only
of the present Convention; or
(d) that the dispute has been admitted to the
agenda of the Security Council or the General
Assembly of the United Nations as being a
threat to international peace, a breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organisation
purporting to have the characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises
de facto authority over persons within a
determinate territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction
of the organized civil authority and are prepared
to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be
bound by the provisions of the Convention.'
9
It ought to be noted however that the above criteria are
not obligatory for the application of Common Article 3, nor were
they intended to be. 20 Rather, the purpose of the criteria is to
indicate the kind of conditions that were deemed to manifest a
genuine situation of armed conflict as distinguished from "a
mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived
insurrection"'', at the diplomatic conference where the Geneva
"9 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field: Commentary, 49
(1952)20 Id. at 50.
21 id
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Conventions of 1949 were negotiated. As such, their utility as a
point of reference is limited. The criteria can not be applied as a
test determining the status of a prima facie situation of armed
conflict.
22
In terms of its substance, at the very heart of Common
Article 3 is a standard of humane treatment for the victims of
armed conflict, considered by the International Committee for
the Red Cross (ICRC) to be "the fundamental principle
underlying the four Geneva Conventions. 23 Parties to an armed
conflict are obligated to adhere to its provisions as a "minimum"
and are invited "by means of special arrangements" to bring into
force the norms of international humanitarian law contained in
the other articles of the Geneva Conventions. Also included in
the Article is a clause that is often referred to as embodying a
"right of humanitarian initiative," 21 which permits the
involvement of an impartial humanitarian body, such the ICRC,
to provide humanitarian assistance and mediate between parties
in an armed conflict.
Perhaps the most important provision contained in
Common Article 3 for its contemporary acceptance by state
authorities is the final clause, which states its application "shall
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."
According to the ICRC this clause
makes it absolutely clear that the object of the
Convention is a purely humanitarian one, that it
is in no way concerned with the internal affairs
of States, and that it merely ensures respect for
the few essential rules of humanity which all
civilized nations consider as valid everywhere
22 This is supported by the decision of the Diplomatic Conference not
to include a definition or list of conditions for the recognition of armed
conflict. See Id. at 49.23Id at 50.
24 Id at 57-59.
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and under all circumstances and as being above
and outside war itself
25
The final clause of Common Article 3 verifies the fact
that it serves a strictly humanitarian purpose and, as such, poses
no threat to the security of a state by compromising any of the
legal means at its disposal to suppress insurgency. Despite the
presence of the provision stating that the legal status of parties to
the conflict will not be affected, the main problem with the
implementation of Common Article 3 is in the recognition of
internal armed conflict as such by state authorities.
Governments often find it less expedient to formally recognize
the existence of armed conflict than to treat it as a mere internal
disturbance, aggressively suppressing it.
26
The act of formally recognizing the existence of an
armed conflict is, from the State's point of view,
disadvantageous for a number of reasons. First, it highlights the
failure of the state in preventing such a situation. Second, it is
possible for it to contribute to the perceived recognition of
insurgents as legitimate combatants. Third, acknowledging the
existence of an armed conflict automatically brings into force the
most basic provisions of international humanitarian law, limiting
the State's use of repressive measures. These three reasons serve
as examples of the underlying issues which motivate States in
refusing to acknowledge the existence of armed conflict. It is
important to appreciate, however, that a State's refusal to
recognise de facto armed conflict does not decide the
inapplicability of international humanitarian law. As rightly
emphasized by the ICRC, "the ascertainment whether there is a
non-international armed conflict does not depend on the
25 Id. at 60.
26 Examples of armed conflicts where the application of international
humanitarian law has been denied include situations in the West Bank,
Kuwait, and East Timor. The parties denying applicability in these
situations are, respectively, Israel, Iraq and Indonesia. See T. Meron,
The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 261
n. 119 (2000).
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subjective judgment of the parties to the conflict; it must be
determined on the basis of objective criteria., 27 Hence the need
for clarifying the conditions deemed to constitute a de facto
situation of armed conflict, thus triggering the application of
Common Article 3.
As there is no set of criteria built into Common Article 3
determining the conditions of its application, the act of
recognizing the existence of armed conflict is usually left to the
discretion of the central government authorities of the State
hosting the conflict.2 8 The lack of a formula distinguishing
situations of internal armed conflict arguably undermines the
implementation of international humanitarian law. 29 Although
the conditions for the application of Additional Protocol II are
contained therein, the instrument still faces the same problem of
recognition in its implementation. The section that follows
examines the scope of the Protocol in terms of its material field
of application. In doing so, some of the main impediments to its
implementation are analyzed.
2. Additional Protocol II
Until the adoption of Additional Protocol II by the ICRC
Conference in 1977, Common Article 3 encapsulated the main
body of law governing non-international armed conflict-hence
27 See ICRC Working Paper, at
http://www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8_2e19990629.html (June 29, 1999)
(submitted by the ICRC as a reference document to assist the
Preparatory Commission in its work to establish the elements of crimes
for the International Criminal Court.
28 See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 45
(Cambridge University Press 2002). See also P.K. Menon, Recognition
of Belligerency and Insurgency, in THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES 109-137 (Edwin Mellon
Press 1994).
29 According to Jean Pictet, "it must be acknowledged that some
[states] evade their responsibilities simply by denying the existence of
an armed conflict." Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of
International Humanitarian Law 47 (1985).
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its description as a "mini-convention."3 ° According to Roberts
and Guelff,3' the need for a new instrument applicable to internal
armed conflict is evidenced by the way in which
experience demonstrated the inadequacy of the
common article. While its provisions do extend
certain fundamental humanitarian protections to
non-combatants, they do not provide any
definitive codification of the laws of war for
non-international armed conflicts. Moreover,
the provisions are so general and incomplete that
they cannot be regarded as an adequate guide for
the conduct of belligerents in such conflicts.
32
Additional Protocol II was created to expand on the
protection provided by Common Article 3.33 Its application,
however, is dependent upon a higher intensity of armed conflict.
It applies to "situations at or near the level of a full-scale civil
war." 34 Article 1(1) states that the Protocol is applicable only to
non-international armed conflicts which "take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
30 1 Pictet et al, id. at 48.
31 ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR 481, 482 (3d ed., 2000).
32 id.
33 Article 1.1 states that the Protocol "develops and supplements Article
3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without
modifying its existing conditions of application." Additional Protocol
II, supra note 8, art. 1.1, 1125 U.N.T.S at 611. The first paragraph of
the Preamble underlines to the importance Common Article 3, stating
"that the humanitarian principles enshrined in Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 constitute the foundation of
respect for the human person in cases of armed conflict not of an
international character." Additional Protocol 11, supra note 8, art. 1.1,
1125 U.N.T.S at 611 (footnote omitted).
34 Minimum Humanitarian Standards: Analytical Report of the
Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1997/21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, 79 (1998).
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and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations[.]' 35
The Protocol was originally intended to apply to all
situations of non-international armed conflict, with the same
threshold of application as Common Article 3. However, in the
drafting of the instrument it became apparent during negotiations
that the consensus required for its adoption would never be
36reached without raising the threshold of its application. As a
result, it now stands as a self-contained instrument with a
material field of application distinctly higher than that of
Common Article 3. According to the ICRC, "[k]eeping the
Protocol separate from Common Article 3 was intended to
prevent undercutting the scope of Article 3 itself by laying down
precise rules. In this way Common Article 3 [retains] an
independent existence." 3' By not developing Additional
Protocol II as an extension of Common Article 3, delegates at the
ICRC Conference avoided any changes to the scope of the
Article's application.
Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II states that
"situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature" do not amount to an armed conflict. 38 According to the
ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol II, the application of
the term "armed conflict" requires "the existence of open
hostilities between armed forces which are organised to a greater
35 Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 1.1, 1125 U.N.T.S at 611.
36 See Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), in COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1307, 1919-1364 (Yves Sandoz
et al. eds., 1987).
17Id. at 1350.
38 Additional Protocol I1, supra note 8, art. 1.1, 1125 U.N.T.S at 611.
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or lesser degree."'3 9
Internal disturbances and tensions, characterised
by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not
therefore constitute armed conflict in a legal
sense . . . [N]on-international armed conflict
seems to be a situation in which hostilities break
out between armed forces or organised armed
groups within the territory of a single state.
Insurgents fighting against the established order
would normally seek to overthrow the
government in power or alternatively to bring
about a secession so as to set up a new state. n
Although Additional Protocol II distinguishes more
substantively than Common Article 3 its context of application,
it nevertheless faces the same obstacle in its implementation: the
non-recognition by a state of the existence of armed conflict. In
this way, "the first line of [sic] against international
humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all. A1 The third
Article of Additional Protocol II concerns the principle of non-
intervention and reinforces the discretionary power of the State
not to recognize the existence of armed conflict:
1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for
the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a
State or the responsibility of the
government, by all legitimate means, to
maintain or re-establish law and order in the
State or to defend the national unity and
territorial integrity of the State.
39 Junod, supra note 36, at 1319.40 Id. at 1319-1320 (footnotes omitted).
41 R.R. Baxter, Some Existing Problems of Humanitarian Law in the
Concept of International Armed Conflict: Further Outlook 1, 2
(Proceedings of the International Symposium on Humanitarian Law,
Brussels) (1974).
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2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as
a justification for intervening, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
armed conflict or in the internal or external
affairs of the High Contracting Party in the
territory of which that conflict occurs.42
The formal recognition of armed conflict by a
neighboring country or international body may be deemed to
impinge on the internal affairs of the state hosting the conflict.
Thus the act of recognition, according to P.K. Menon, "[if] given
too early may be tantamount to intervention and lead to
international friction. Premature recognition is... looked upon
by the parent State as a gratuitous demonstration of sympathy
which may amount to an unfriendly act. ' 43 In view of the lack of
objective criteria contained in common Article 3 and the
problematic nature of the those contained Additional Protocol II,
the issue of recognition is one that is central to the
implementation of international humanitarian law. In the next
section, the concept of armed conflict employed by the ICTY is
examined in order to consider how it might assist in the
recognition of internal armed conflict.
B. Tadic: A Formula for the Recognition of
Armed Conflict
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia expounded the following notion of armed conflict in
its Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between
42 Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 3, 1125 U.N.T.S at 611-12.
43 Menon, supra note 26, at 136-37.
VOL. 12
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State.
International humanitarian law applies from the
initiation of such armed conflicts and extends
beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of
internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is
achieved. Until that moment, international
humanitarian law continues to apply in the
whole territory of the warring States or, in the
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory
under the control of a party, whether or not
actual combat takes place there. 4
The characterization of "protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups"
as a situation of armed conflict merits particular attention. This
formula was applied by the ICTY Appeals Chamber to the
situation in the Prijedor region of Bosnia and Herzegovina.45 In
determining the existence of armed conflict in Prijedor the
Appeals Chamber held, in accordance with the concept outlined
above, that "the temporal and geographical scope of both internal
and international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time
and place of hostilities. ''46 Thus, international humanitarian law
does not pertain only to those areas where actual fighting takes
place; it applies to the entire territory of the state involved in
armed conflict. This is also supported by the position of the
ICTY Trial Chamber in the Delalic case, holding that "whether
or not the conflict is deemed to be international or internal, there
does not have to be actual combat activities in a particular
location for the norms of international humanitarian law to be
applicable.
'A7
44 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 2, 70.
45 Id.
46 Id. 67.
47 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo, Trial Chamber
Judgment, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T, 185 (16 November 1998).
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The Tribunal's position concerning the temporal scope
of armed conflict confirms the constant applicability of
international humanitarian law to situations of protracted armed
violence where hostilities are not necessarily to be characterized
as continuous.48 The inclusion of a peaceful settlement by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber as an ending point for internal armed
conflict is also significant in that it prevents a party to the
conflict from limiting the application of international
humanitarian law by refusing to recognize its existence for
reasons of self-interest or expediency.
The Tadic Jurisdiction Decision arguably embodies an
innovative elucidation of the grounds for applying international
humanitarian law. The concept of armed conflict outlined
therein is also applied in subsequent decisions of the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Tadic
Trial Chamber adhered to the formula expounded in the
Jurisdiction Decision, interpreting it as a "test" which focuses on
"two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the
organization of the parties to the conflict. '49 The Trial Chamber
also stated that in "an armed conflict of an internal or mixed
character, these closely related criteria are used solely for the
purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from
banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections... which are
not subject to international humanitarian law.",50
The formula propounded by the Tadic Jurisdiction
Decision is again applied by the Tribunal in the Delalic case. 51
Similar to the position of the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case,
the Trial Chamber in Delalic stated that the formula may be
applied in situations of "internal armed conflict in order to
48 See A. Zimmermann, War Crimes Committed in an Armed Conflict
Not of an International Character (Commentary on Statute of the
International Criminal Court) 285 (1999).
49 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 562.
50 Id.
51 Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-
96-21, 183 (16 November 1998).
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distinguish from cases of civil unrest., 52 In addition, it asserted
that the emphasis in making such a distinction is on "the
protracted extent of the armed violence and the extent of
organisation of the parties involved. 53
The formula was also applied by the ICTY in the
Furundzia case to determine the existence of armed conflict
between the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) during May 1993. 54 It was
similarly employed as the appropriate standard in the Kunarac
case, supporting the Tribunal's position on the existence of
armed conflict between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in
the municipalities of Foca, Gacko and Kalinovik."
The considerable influence of the concept contained in
the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision is further demonstrated by its
adoption by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Rwanda
(ICTR): In the Akayesu case it refers to the formula in
determining the existence of armed conflict in Rwanda.16 Here
the application of the formula is in line with that of the ICTY.
The Rwandan Tribunal conceives defacto armed conflict as "the
existence of hostilities between armed forces organized to a
greater or lesser extent. ' 57 Adopting an approach similar to that
previously mentioned in the case law of ICTY, the ICTR held
that in order to determine the existence of armed conflict it is
521d. 184.
53 Id.
54 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-95-
17/1, 59 (10 December 1998).
55 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Appeals Chamber
Judgement, Case No. IT-96-23, 56 (12 June 2002). Other ICTY cases
employing the standard propounded in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision
include Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Trial Chamber II Judgment,
Case No. IT-97-25, 51 (15 March 2002); and Prosecutor v. Miroslav
Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub Prcac,
Trial Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 123 (2 November
2001).
56 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 16, 69.57 Id. 620.
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"necessary to evaluate both the intensity and organization of the
parties to the conflict. ' 8
As noted by Claus Kress, much of the debate
surrounding decisions of the ICTY has focused on the
classification of armed conflict. 59 There is relatively little
published specifically on the Tadic formula by scholars of
international humanitarian law. Filling this gap, however, are
publications on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, referring to the origins of Article 8(2)(f). 60 The next
section examines this provision as an adaptation of the Tadic
formula.
C. The Adaptation of the Tadic Formula in
Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute
The Tadic formula for the recognition of internal armed
conflict is included, albeit slightly amended, in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court. The controversial inclusion
of jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international
armed conflicts arguably represents a significant achievement in
securing a greater degree of protection for the victims of such
situations. According to Darryl Robinson and Herman von
Hebel,
it remained controversial throughout the
negotiations whether war crimes in internal
armed conflict should be included in the Statute
at all. Some delegations strongly believed that
58 Id.
59 C. Kress, War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed
Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice, 30
ISR. Y.B. Human Rights 103, 117-118 (2001).
60 See Zimmermann, supra note 47, at 285; M. BOOT, NULLUM
CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES 529 (Oxford: Intersentia 2002) WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 124 (Cambridge University Press 2001).
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the ICC Statute should not include such norms,
as it was feared that ICC competence over such
crimes would be an unacceptable intrusion on
sovereignty and would undermine the general
acceptability of the Statute.6'
Delegations holding a position against the insertion of
provisions relating to non-international armed conflicts included
India, China, Turkey, Sudan and the Russian Federation. 62
According to Thomas Graditzky, "[t]he issues of whether to
include a non-international armed conflicts clause and what
threshold should be adopted dominated discussions." 63 In
support of jurisdiction extending over situations of non-
international armed conflict, it was pointed out at the Conference
that "most of the armed conflicts that have raged around the
world since World War II have been conflicts of a non-
international character, and that it is precisely in internal armed
conflicts that humanitarian considerations are most brutally
disregarded and national criminal justice systems least likely to
adequately respond to violations."' 64 Taking into account the
frequency of internal armed conflict, and also that the Statute of
the ICTR had expressly covered situations of non-international
armed conflict, 5 it was eventually recognized during
negotiations that the exclusion of provisions relating to such
situations would result in an unacceptable restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court.66
61 D. Robinson & H. von Hebel, War Crimes in Internal Conflicts:
Article 8 of the ICC Statute, 2 Y.B. INT'L HUM. L., 193 ,199 (1999).
62 Id.
63 T. Graditzky, War Crime Issues Before the Rome Diplomatic
Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 5
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L & POL'Y, 199, 210 (1999).
64 See Robinson & von Hebel, supra note 61, at 199.
65 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598.
66 Id. at 1604.
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Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute states that the Court's
jurisdiction will include situations of non-international armed
conflict taking place in the territory of a State where there exists
a situation of "protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups." 67 Here the term "protracted armed conflict" is
substituted for "protracted armed violence." This sentence has
been criticised for introducing a new category of armed
conflict. 68 Theodor Meron states, however, that the provision
"should not be considered as creating yet another threshold of
applicability. 69 Nonetheless, he also remarks that "it may well
exacerbate the previous lack of clarity" concerning the concept
of non-international armed conflict.
70
Kress describes the provision contained in Article 8(2)(f)
as "slightly inaccurate ' 71 on the basis that it was not the intention
of the drafters to substitute "protracted armed conflict" for
"protracted armed violence., 72 He states that, as the French
version of the Rome Statute includes the original wording of the
Tadic formula,73 the English version should not give rise to
misunderstanding. 74 (This is significant as paragraph one of
Article 128 of the Rome Statute states that "Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic.") 75 Kress's position also appears to be supported by
the analysis contained in an ICRC working paper which states
that "[t]he addition of the word "protracted" to armed conflict
seems to be redundant since protracted violence is a constituent
67 Rome Statute, supra note 11, at 1006.
68 Kress, supra note 59, at 117-118.
69 T. Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 239, 260 (2000).70 Id. at 260.
71 Kress, supra note 59, at 118.
72 id.
73 id.
74 id.
75 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 128.
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element of an armed conflict not of an international character."76
The authority of the Tadic formula as a test for
distinguishing situations of armed conflict is supplemented by its
application to situations in regions including the Middle East,77
Somalia7 8 and Kosovo.79 It is arguable that there exists scope for
its future development into a more substantive measure for
determining the existence of armed conflict. Although its
employment by the ICTY,80 the ICTR,81 the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights 82 and the Rome Conference
drafting the ICC Statute 83 demonstrate the utility of the
definition, further refinement is needed to ensure clarity in
distinguishing situations that reach the threshold of internal
armed conflict. As noted by the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda
Tribunal in the Rutaganda case, the Tadic formula is still
"termed in the abstract, and whether or not a situation can be
described as an 'armed conflict' . . . is to be decided upon a case-
76 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Working Paper, 29
June 1999, available at
http://www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8_2e 19990629.html.
77 See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Mr. John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (Mar. 6, 2002),
E/CN.4/2002/32, 18. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, (Oct. 4, 2001),
U.N. Doc. A/56/440, 13 (Oct. 4, 2001).
78 See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, Prepared
by the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights, Ms.
Mona Rishmawi, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1996/57 of 19
April 1996, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/88, 54 (1997).
79 See Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Conflict, 837 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 217 (2000).
80 See infra, pp. 13-15.
SI See infra, pp. 16-17.
82 See supra notes 76-77.
831d at 16-19.
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by-case. 84
III. The Distinction Between Internal and International
Armed Conflict
The purpose of this part of the paper is to examine
grounds for the classification of the armed conflict, focusing on
the conditions contained in the decisions of the Tadic case. It is
structured in three sections. The first section evaluates the
position of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Jurisdiction
Decision on the internationalisation of a prima facie internal
armed conflict. The second section explicates the Trial
Chamber's use of the "effective control" test to assess the
involvement of the FRY in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The third
section elucidates the test of "overall control" propounded by the
Appeals Chamber as an alternative to that of the Trial Chamber.
In doing so, some common ground in the positions of the two
chambers is highlighted before points of divergence and the
influence of the "overall control" test on the subsequent case law
of the Tribunal are examined.
A. Proof of Direct Involvement by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a Condition for
Internationalisation
After confirming the existence of armed conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic
Jurisdiction Decision then corroborated that it had jurisdiction
over crimes committed in the context of non-international as
well as international armed conflicts.8 5 The Appeals Chamber
held that the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
possessed both "internal and international aspects. 86 It did so,
reasoning that
84 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. ICTR-
96-3, 91 (6 Dec. 1999).85 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 2, 71-142.
86 Id. 72, 77-78.
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[t]he conflict in the former Yugoslavia had been
rendered international by the involvement of the
Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by
the involvement of the Yugoslav National Army
("JNA") in hostilities in Croatia, as well as in
Bosnia-Herzegovina at least until its formal
withdrawal on 19 May 1992. To the extent that
the conflicts had been limited to clashes between
Bosnian Government forces and Bosnian Serb
rebel forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as
between the Croatian Government and Croatian
Serb rebel forces in Krajina (Croatia), they had
been internal (unless direct involvement of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) could be proven).87
Although the Appeals Chamber does not decide on the
nature of the conflict in this decision, it does delineate the
condition of direct involvement of the FRY for the recognition of
the armed conflict as international during the period in which the
alleged offences occurred. 88 This point is important for
demarcating the scope of the concept of internal armed conflict,
and thus is of particular significance to future decisions
concerning the character of the conflict.
Prior to the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision there existed a
strong consensus among scholars of international humanitarian
law that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was to be
characterized as a single international armed conflict and not as a
series of distinct conflicts each with a separate status. 89 By
87 Id. 72. Emphasis added.
88 Id.
89 According to Christopher Greenwood, the Decision of the Appeals
Chamber "swims against the tide of much literature on the conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia, which has tended to treat the entirety of the
conflicts as a single entity and as international in character." T. Meron,
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, AM. J. INT'L L.
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asserting that the "conflicts" possessed both "internal and
international aspects," the Appeals Chamber adopted a position
which left undetermined the status of the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina at the time the alleged crimes were committed. 90
The task of deciding the character of the armed conflict was thus
left to the Trial Chamber.
B. The Test of "Effective Control"
The Judgment of the Trial Chamber9 does not explicitly
characterize the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after May
19, 1992 as being either internal or international.92 However, in
deciding that Article 2 of the ICTY Statute was not applicable to
the situation, 93 it implicitly determined that character of the
armed conflict to be non-international.94
In order to establish whether or not the acts perpetrated
by Dusko Tadic after May 19, 1992 are to be considered as
crimes against "protected persons," 95 the Trial Chamber enquired
554, 556 (1995). See also G.H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 90 A.J.I.L 64 , 66
(1996); J.C. O'Brien, Current Developments: The International Tribu-
nal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia, 87 A.J.I.L 639, 647 (1993); and T. Meron, War Crimes in
Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 A.J.I.L 78,
81(1994).
90 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 2, 77.
9' Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2.
92 Id. 86.
93 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, SC
Res 827, 48 UN SCOR (3217th mtg), UN Doc S/Res/827 (1993),
reprinted in 32 ILM 1203.
94 Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 2, 86.
95 According to Article 4 of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
[p]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
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into the relationship between the VRS and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY). According to the Chamber's analysis, if
the FRY was in a position of "effective control" over the VRS
(Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Republika Srpska) during the time in question, then the victims
would qualify as "protected persons" under the fourth Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, being "in the hands of an occupying power of which
they were not nationals.
9 6
This categorization of Tadic's victims as protected
persons would automatically imply the existence of international
armed conflict. However, if the relationship between the FRY
and the VRS constituted one of no more than the latter's depen-
dence on the former, then the conflict would be considered non-
international. As it is not considered possible for grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions to occur in the context of a non-
international armed conflict, the consequence of such a finding
would be that 11 of the 31 counts against Tadic would be
deemed inapplicable and thus dismissed by the Tribunal. Thus
the question that faced the Trial Chamber,
[was] whether, after 19 May 1992, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro), by its withdrawal from the territory of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
notwithstanding its continuing support for the
VRS, had sufficiently distanced itself from the
VRS so that those forces could not be regarded
as defacto organs or agents of the VJ and hence
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.97
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949).
96 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 582.
97Id. 587.
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In answering this question, the Trial Chamber applied a
test developed by the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case. Although the circumstances of the armed
conflict in the Nicaragua case differed significantly to the
conflict being considered by the Tribunal in Bosnia
Herzegovina, 98 the test of "effective control" was deemed an
appropriate means of assessing the involvement of FRY. The
purpose of its application in the Nicaragua case was to
determine,
whether or not the relationship of the contras to
the United States Government was so much one
of dependence on the one side and control on the
other that it would be right to equate the contras,
for legal purposes, with an organ of the United
States Government, or as acting on behalf of that
Government.99
Similarly, the rationale for its application in the Tadic
case was to answer the question of whether "the requisite degree
of command and control by the VJ, and hence the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ... over the VRS is established for the
purposes of imputing the acts of those forces operating in opstina
Prijedor or the VRS as a whole to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia."' 00 To illustrate the test of "effective control" the
Trial Chamber uses the following quotation from the Nicaragua
case:
United States participation, even if
preponderant or decisive, in the financing,
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of
the contras, the selection of its military or
paramilitary targets, and the planning of the
whole of its operation, is still insufficient in
9' Id. 586-587.
99 Nicar. V. U.S., supra note 13, 109 (Merit Judgment) (1986).100 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 586.
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itself, on the basis of the evidence in the
possession of the Court, for the purposes of
attributing to the United States the acts
committed by the contras in the course of their
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.
All forms of United States participation
mentioned above, and even the general control
by the respondent State over a force with a high
degree of dependency on it, would not in
themselves mean, without further evidence, that
the United States directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights
and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant
State. Such acts could well be committed by
members of the contras without the control of
the United States. For this conduct to give rise
to legal responsibility of the United States, it
would in principle have to be proved that that
State had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which
the alleged violations were committed.0 1
This quotation demonstrates the particularly stringent
nature of the test being applied by the Trial Chamber to the
relationship between the VRS and the FRY. Adhering to the
above concept of "effective control", the words "directed or
enforced" imply that evidence of specific instructions is required
in order for the FRY to be held responsible for the violations of
international humanitarian law committed by the VRS.' °2 The
Trial Chamber acknowledges in this regard that the Nicaragua
case sets a "particularly high threshold test."'
0 3
'' Nicaragua v. United States, 115 as cited in Tadic Trial Judgment,
supra note 2, 585. Emphasis added by the Trial Chamber.
102 Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, 100.
103 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 585. In order for the United
States to held responsible for violations of international humanitarian
law perpetrated by the contras, "it would in principle have to be proven
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Applying the "effective control" test outlined above, the
Trial Chamber held that the FRY was not sufficiently
responsible for the command and control of operations in Bosnia
and Herzegovina for the conflict to be regarded as international
at the time the alleged acts were committed:
The Trial Chamber is [... ] of the view that, on
the evidence presented to it, after 19 May 1992
the armed forces of the Republika Srpska could
not be considered as defacto organs or agents of
the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), either in
opstina Prijedor or more generally. For that
reason, each of the victims of the acts ascribed
to the accused in Section III of this Opinion and
Judgment enjoy the protection of the
prohibitions contained in Common Article 3,
applicable as it is to all armed conflicts, rather
than the protection of the more specific grave
breaches regime applicable to civilians in the
hands of a party to an armed conflict of which
they are not nationals, which falls under Article
2 of the Statute.
10 4
The Trial Chamber supported this position by arguing
that there was insufficient evidence to prove the prosecutor's
contention that the VRS acted as de facto armed forces of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. °5 According to the decision of
the majority, the prosecutor had failed to demonstrate that "the
FRY exercised the potential for control inherent in that
relationship of dependency or that the VRS has otherwise placed
that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed." Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 14, 115.
104 Id. 607.
'o' Id. 606.
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itself under the control of the Government of the FRY."' 10 6 The
presiding Judge, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, however made a
strong dissent. She argued that the decision of the majority
misinterpreted the Nicaragua case, applying a test even more
demanding than that required to assess the involvement of FRY.
According to McDonald, "the appropriate test of agency from
Nicaragua is one of "dependency and control" and a showing of
effective control is not required."'
0 7
The position of the Trial Chamber is also criticized by
Theodor Meron:
[T]he problem in the trial chamber's approach
lay not in its interpretation of Nicaragua, but in
applying Nicaragua to Tadic at all. Obviously,
the Nicaragua test addresses only the question of
state responsibility. Conceptually, it cannot
determine whether a conflict is international or
internal. In practice, applying the Nicaragua test
to the question in Tadic produces artificial and
incongruous conclusions."s
106 Id 588.
107 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the
Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, Case No. IT-94-I-AR 72 4 (7
May 1997).
108 T. Meron, Classification of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia:
Nicaragua's Fallout 92 AJIL 236 at 237 (1998). The Trial Chamber in
the Delalic case rejected the test of effective control for similar reasons:
While this decision of the ICJ constitutes an important source
of jurisprudence on various issues of international law, it is
always important to note the dangers of relying upon the
reasoning and findings of a very different judicial body
concerned with rather different circumstances from the case in
hand. The International Tribunal is a criminal judicial body,
established to prosecute and punish individuals for violations
of international humanitarian law, and not to determine State
responsibility for acts of aggression or unlawful intervention.
It is, therefore, inappropriate to transpose wholesale into the
present context the test enunciated by the ICJ to determine the
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On the test of "effective control'," Meron goes on the say that
"even a quick perusal of international law literature would
establish that imputability is not a test commonly used in judging
whether a foreign intervention leads to the internationalization of
the conflict and the applicability of those rules of international
humanitarian law that govern armed conflicts of an international
character."1 °9 As pointed out by Michael Scharf, l 0 the Trial
Chamber's thinking is also at variance with the approach of Trial
Chamber II during the Rule 61 proceedings in the Rajic case
where the "effective control" test was considered inapplicable."' 1
The inappropriateness of the test for assessing the involvement
of the FRY in Bosnia and Herzegovina is demonstrated further
by the significantly different circumstances of its original
application by the International Court of Justice:
[T]he contras were never United States nationals
or members of the U.S. Army; the United States
responsibility of the United States for the actions of the
contras in Nicaragua.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-
96-21, 230 (16 Nov. 1998).
'
09 Id. at 239.
"1o M.P. Scharf, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 91 AJIL 718 , 720 (1997).
... According to Trial Chamber II,
the ICJ was considering state responsibility for violations of
international humanitarian law and therefore focused on U.S.
operational control over the contras, whereas the chamber was
not considering Croatia's liability for acts committed by
Bosnian Croats but merely whether the Bosnian Croats could
be considered agents of Croatia for the purpose of establishing
subject matter jurisdiction regarding acts alleged to violate the
grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, for
which specific operational control was not of paramount
importance.
Prosecutor v. Rajic, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13 September 1996, Case No. IT-
95-12-R61, 22.
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did not create the contras, although their numbers
increased once the United States began to offer
assistance; and there was no attempt by the
United States to annex the territory of Nicaragua.
In contrast, the Bosnian Serb army was created by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro); it was commanded by former
members of the JNA, who continued to receive
their pay[]checks from Belgrade; it acted in
furtherance of the goal of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to annex parts of Bosnia; and it
followed the strategy and tactics devised by the
JNA prior to May 19, 1992.'12
The section that follows examines the test of "overall
control" proposed by the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber as
an alternative to that of the Trial Chamber. In doing so, common
ground as well as points of divergence on the characterization of
armed conflict are highlighted.
C. The Test of "Overall Control"
The test of "overall control" employed by the Appeals
Chamber on July 15, 1999, is similar in a number of ways to the
test of "effective control" used by the Trial Chamber. First, a
question both Chambers sought to answer in applying their
respective tests was whether the VRS existed, at the time the
alleged crimes were committed, as a defacto organ of the FRY.
In doing so, both held that if this condition was fulfilled the
conflict would be rendered international. The Trial Chamber
Judgment states that "the acts of the armed forces of the
Republika Srpska... may be imputed to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) if those forces were acting
as de facto organs or agents of that State." '13 Likewise, the
decision of the Appeals Chamber asserts that,
112 Scharf, supra note 110, at 721.
113 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 584.
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[t]he question whether after 19 May 1992 [the
armed conflict] continued to be international or
became instead exclusively internal turns on the
issue of whether Bosnian Serb forces - in whose
hands the Bosnian victims in this case found
themselves - could be considered as de jure or
de facto organs of a foreign Power, namely the
FRY.'
1 4
Secondly, both Chambers implicitly accepted, as
stipulated in the Tadic Jurisdiction decision, the direct
involvement of the FRY as a condition for the
internationalisation of the armed conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 115 The Trial Chamber held the character of the
armed conflict depends on "the degree of involvement of the VJ
and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) after the withdrawal of the JNA on 19
May 1992. '16 The Appeals Chamber held that in order for the
conflict to be rendered international that the level of involvement
required by the FRY must go "beyond the mere financing and
equipping of [the VRS] and involv[e] also participation in the
planning and supervision of military operations.""' 7
Thirdly, the decisions of both the Trial and Appeals
Chambers stipulated that in order for the armed conflict to be
internationalised a degree of control by the FRY is required over
the VRS. It is clear, nonetheless, that the threshold of control
required for the internationalisation of the armed conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina differs fundamentally between the two
chambers. The main point of divergence between the test of
''overall control" employed by the Appeals Chamber and the test
of "effective control" used by the Trial Chamber is that the latter
114 Id. 87.
115 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 2, 72.
116 Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 571.
117 Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note, 3 145.
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possesses a distinctly higher threshold of application. 118 The
"overall control" test does not require the issuance of specific
instructions by the authorities of the supporting State to either
the head or members of the insurgent armed forces for it to be
deemed responsible for their actions.
1 19
In refuting the test of "effective control" proposed by the
Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber summarizes its position on
the degree of control required by the applicable test:
[C]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed
forces or militias or paramilitary units may be
of an overall character (and must comprise more
than the mere provision of financial assistance or
military equipment or training). This
requirement, however, does not go so far as to
include the issuing of specific orders by the
State, or its direction of each individual
operation. Under international law it is by no
means necessary that the controlling authorities
should plan all the operations of the units
dependent on them, choose their targets, or give
specific instructions concerning the conduct of
military operations and any alleged violations of
international humanitarian law.12
118 This point is made in the Aleksovski case:
Bearing in mind that the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic
Judgment arrived at this test against the background of the
"effective control" test set out by the decision of the ICJ in
Nicaragua, and the "specific instructions" test used by the
Trial Chamber in Tadic, the Appeals Chamber considers it
appropriate to say that the standard established by the "overall
control" test is not as rigorous as those tests.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-
95-14/1, 134 (24 March 2000).119 Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, 131.
120 Id 137. Emphasis in original.
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Holding that the Trial Chamber erred in its exclusive use
of the "effective control" test as a means of assessing the
involvement of the FRY,121 the Appeals Chamber reasoned the
more appropriate standard to be one of "overall control."
Accordingly,
[i]n order to attribute the acts of a military or
paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved
that the State wields overall control over the
group, not only by equipping and financing the
group, but also by coordinating or helping in the
general planning of its military activity. Only
then can the State be held internationally
accountable for any misconduct of the group.
22
Applying the test of "overall control" to the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Appeals Chamber found that the
relationship between the VRS and the FRY fulfilled the test,
because FRY manifested control "not only in financial, logistical
and other assistance and support, but also, and more importantly,
in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination
and supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS.'' 123
In doing so, it held that "[t]his sort of control is sufficient for the
purposes of the legal criteria required by international law."'
124
The test of "effective control," demanding the additional
requirement of evidence of specific instructions, was considered
by the Appeals Chamber to be an excessively stringent measure
for determining the FRY's scale of involvement. 125 It argued
against the use of the test, contending that it is at variance with
judicial and state practice126 and also that it does not appear to be
121 Id. 170.
122 1d 131.
123 Id. 156. Emphasis added.
1241d 156.
125 1d 112.
126 Id. 124-162.
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consonant with the logic of the law of state responsibility. 127
On the latter point, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that
"[t]he principles of international law concerning the attribution
to States of acts performed by private individuals are not based
on rigid and uniform criteria."' 28 The degree of control required
for an individual to regarded as a defacto organ of a state varies
according to his or her situation.1 29 Accordingly,
[o]ne should distinguish the situation of
individuals acting on behalf of a State without
specific instructions, from that of individuals
making up an organised and hierarchically
structured group, such as a military unit or, in
case of war or civil strife, armed bands of
irregulars or rebels. Plainly, an organised group
differs from an individual in that the former
normally has a structure, a chainof command
and a set of rules as well as the outward symbols
of authority. Normally a member of the group
does not act on his own but conforms to the
standards prevailing in the group and is subject
to the authority of the head of the group.
Consequently, for the attribution to a State of
acts of these groups it is sufficient to require that
the group as a whole be under the overall control
of the State. 3°
27Id. 116-123.
128 d. 117.
129 Id. The Appeals Chamber held that, aside from the test of overall
control, international law provides for two other tests of responsibility
depending on the situation of an individual. The first is the test of
"specific instructions" and applies to "single individuals or militarily
unorganised groups." The second is the "test is the assimilation of
individuals to State organs on account of their actual behaviour within
the structure of a State (and regardless of any possible requirement of
State instructions)." Id. 141. Emphasis in original.
130 Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, 120.
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The "effective control" test, necessitating evidence of
specific instructions for the acts in question, exceeds the standard
required by the International Law Commission (ILC). 131
Drawing on the provisions contained in Articles 7, 8 and 10 of
the ILC's Draft on State Responsibility, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that,
international law renders any State responsible
for acts in breach of international law performed
(i) by individuals having the formal status of
organs of a State (and this occurs even when
these organs act ultra vires or contra legem), or
(ii) by individuals who make up organised
groups subject to the State's control.
International law does so regardless of whether
or not the State has issued specific instructions
to those individuals.
32
Using the Draft on State Responsibility as a basis for
illustrating the doctrine of public international law, the Appeals
Chamber held that the situation of an organized armed group is
distinctively different to that of a single private individual acting
on behalf a state. 133 In the case of an armed group, "[i]f it is
under the overall control of a State, it must perforce engage the
responsibility of that State for its activities, whether or not each
of them was specially imposed, requested or directed by the
State." 134 Thus members of an armed group may be held
accountable for their actions as de facto agents of a state
providing the state "has a role in organising, coordinating or
planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to
financing, training and equipping or providing operational
... Id. 117.
132 Id. 123. Emphasis in original.
133 Id. 122.
134 Id. 122. Emphasis in original.
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support to that group.,
135
In supporting its claim that the effective control test is at
variance with judicial and state practice, the Chamber referred to
the jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 136 the
European Court of Human Rights1 37 and the International Court
of Justice. 138 It also alluded to the decision of the
Oberlandesgericht of Dfisseldorf in Jorgic case:
[T]he Court held that the Bosnian Serbs fighting
against the central authorities of Sarajevo had
acted on behalf of the FRY. To support this
finding, the court emphasised that Belgrade
financed, organised and equipped the Bosnian
Serb army and paramilitary units and that there
existed between the JNA and the Bosnian Serbs
'a close personal, organisational and logistical
interconnection [Verflechtung]', which was
considered to be a sufficient basis for regarding
the conflict as international. The court did not
enquire as to whether or not the specific acts
committed by the accused or other Bosnian
Serbs had been ordered by the authorities of the
FRY. 139
As a means of assessing the character of an armed
conflict, the value of the "overall control" test proposed by the
Tadic Appeals Chamber is supported by its continued usage in
the subsequent case law of the ICTY. The cases of Aleksovski,1
40
135 Id. 137.
136 Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 IRAN-
U.S.C.T.R. 92 (vol. IV) (1987).
117 Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2217. For a summary of
the case, see B. Rudolph, International Decisions: Loizidou v. Turke,
91 AJIL 532 (1997).
138 Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 13.
139 Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, 129.
140 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals
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Blaskic14' and Kordic and Cerkez142 each employ the standard as
a means of deciding the status of an armed conflict. The test is
applied in the Aleksovski case to assess the relationship between
the Army of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Defence
Council. 143 The Appeals Chamber held unanimously in this case
that "[t]he overall control test, set out in the Tadic Judgment is
the applicable law."'
144
The Blaskic Trial Chamber applied the standard, stating
that "it is justified to speak of overall control" and thus the
armed conflict under consideration was rendered international.
145
Similarly, in the case of Kordic and Cerkez the test was used to
assess whether the conflict between the Bosnian Croats and
Bosnia Muslims had been internationalised by the involvement
of Croatia. 146 In its decision on the matter, the Trial Chamber
stated that
Croatia exercised overall control over the HVO
through its provision to the HVO of financial
and training assistance, military equipment and
operational support, and by its participation in
the organisation, coordination and planning of
military operations of the HVO. The Chamber
therefore finds that, on that basis, the conflict
between the HVO and the ABiH was rendered
Chamber Judgment, 134 (20 March 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm.
141 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, 100-101 (3 March 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm.
142 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, 115 (26 February 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm.
143 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, supra note 140, 27.
144 Id. 134.
45 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 141, 122.
146 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, supra note 142, 109.
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international. 147
Given the above mentioned usage of the test of "overall
control," and the problems surrounding the test of "effective
control," it appears likely that the standard set by the Tadic
Appeals Chamber will continue to be applied in future
judgments of the Tribunal, characterizing situations of armed
conflict as either internal or international.' 4
The decision of the Appeals Chamber has, however,
been criticized by Marco Sassoli and Laura Olsen for answering
a question of general international law using a standard
substantively different to that provided by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), the principle judicial organ of the United
Nations: "Even if the theory of the Appeals Chamber is well
reasoned, the ICJ can be expected to continue to apply its own
theory to inter-state disputes world-wide. Double standards will
therefore inevitably result."'149 This argument against the test of
"overall control" is, however, defeated by the fact that the
Statute of the ICJ does not provide for precedent. 15 ° Taking this
into account, as stated by Machteld Boot, "[i]t would be strange
if the decisions of the ICJ, not being strictly binding on itself,
would be binding on the Tribunal.' 51 Also worth noting in this
regard is the view expressed by the Appeals Chamber in the
Delalic case that the Tribunal
[is] an autonomous international judicial body,
14 71d. 145.
148 See C. Byron, Armed Conflicts: International or Non-international?,
6 No. 1 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 63, 79 (2001).
149 M. Sassoli and L. Olsen, The Judgment of the ICTY Appeals
Chamber on the Merits of the Tadic Case, 839 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 739-769 (2000).
150 MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR
CRIMES: NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 556
(Intersentia 2002).
151 Id.
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and although the ICJ is the "principal judicial
organ" within the United Nations system to
which the Tribunal belongs, there is no
hierarchical relationship between the two courts.
Although the Appeals Chamber will necessarily
take into consideration other decisions of
international courts, it may, after careful
consideration, come to a different conclusion.
15 2
IV. Conclusion
The concepts provided by the jurisprudence of the ICTY
serve as useful tools for distinguishing the status of situations,
enabling the application of the appropriate body of international
humanitarian law. The purpose of exploring the Tadic case in
this article has been twofold: to illuminate the formula provided
by the Tribunal for the recognition of defacto armed conflict and
to examine the tests proposed in its case law for assessing the
status of an armed conflict as either internal or international.
Analysed in the first part of the article, the body of law
governing non-international armed conflict is deemed
problematic in relation to its lack of sufficient provision for
conditions of implementation. The formula provided by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision has
arguably had positive impact in the elucidation of the conditions
signifying the existence of armed conflict. Its contribution, as a
standard for determining the existence of armed conflict, is
evidenced by its inclusion in the Rome Statute as well as by its
continued application by the ICTY, the ICTR and the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.
The test of "overall control" proposed by the Appeals
Chamber for determining the status of situations of prima facie
internal armed conflict represents another positive development
in international humanitarian law. As an alternative to the test of
"effective control" employed by the Trial Chamber, it represents
152 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 5 1.
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a less restrictive, more flexible standard for determining the
status of an armed conflict as either internal or international.
Using the formula expounded in the Tadic Jurisdiction
Decision and the "overall control" test proposed by the Tadic
Appeals Chamber, it is possible to delineate parameters of
internal armed conflict. Although greater clarity is still needed
in the process of differentiating situations of internal armed
conflict, the conceptual framework provided by these decisions
represents a significant advance in the development of
international humanitarian law.
